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presupposes  rather than exhibits that McDonald's has functioned as a model for the 
design,  or has  served  to  condition  the  development,  of myriad  institutions  and 
processes.  Ritzer asserts the existence of  assembly lines, bureaucracy and scientific 
managment, of predictability, control and efficiency in different spheres of activity, 
but he  never seriously documents  McDonald's as  underlying the  spread of these 
things.  Claims about McDonald's as a model whose principles dominate the social 
world  being  essentially  causal  claims,  their  verification  requires  detailed 
historically-informed sociological comparison of  McDonald's against other possible 
influences, investigation separating out their mutual interactions and weighing their 
relative importance, but this is not work that Ritzer has undertaken.  Further, there 
is nothing in his discussion to justify his claim that McDonald's and other fast-food 
restaurants  are  an  exemplar or paradigm  of a qualitatively  higher rationalization 
than Weber's bureaucracy.  As it appears in Ritzer's chief version of  the thesis (the 
characterization  involving  'formal'  principles),  McDonaldization  is  effectively 
indistinguishable from Weberian rationalization.  He claims with surety that hardly 
any  corner  of American  society  (politics,  sport,  sex,  newspapers,  car  care, 
accounting,  work,  health,  retailing,  manufacturing)  remains  untouched  by 
McDonald's  principles,  but  all  that  means  is  it  has  undergone  pronounced 
rationalization.  Ritzer may be right aboutthis, but he is not original. 
Whether American and international society are as rationalized as Ritzer makes 
out is a fair question, to be considered in  light of possible countertendencies.  The 
present paper has attempted something less ambitious, showing that the privileged 
role Ritzer assigns to McDonald's as an engine of rationalizing change is  a thesis 
which as it stands is, for all its interest and colour, mere speculation, lacking careful 
articulation and wanting rigorous empirical defence. 
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The structure of  this paper is as follows.  We begin with a brief discussion of Michel 
Foucault's (1970) account of the centrality of 'Man' to the modErnist project.  We 
suggest  that  the  emergence  of this  figure  is  connected  to  the  practice  of 
interpretation,  or hermeneutics.  We  restate  Foucault's (1972)  call  for  a method, 
which  is  non-interpretive  and  non-anthropological.  We  then  move  on  to  a Social Theory  179 
discussion  of Bruno  Latour's (1993)  critique of modernism  and  postmodernism. 
There are impOliant lessons in his analysis for a sociology, which wishes to develop 
some  of the  lines  of thought  characteristic of postmodernism.  We  then  discuss 
Latour's attempt to construct a new type of inquiry that we can call a 'sociology of 
criticism'.  Latour's new 'methodology'  learns from the errors of postmodernism. 
This  sociology of criticism, a nonmodernist sociology, should not be hermeneutic, 
but relational, or what Dean (1994) calls semiological. 
Postmodernism is exhausted 
Perhaps we are suffering from millennial fever, but in a time when we are told of  the 
end of  so many themes (history, philosophy, Man, the social, organised capital - you 
name  it,  it's  finished)  it  seems  that the  postmodern  era  is  over.  Nowadays  its 
protagonists are  reduced to  empty assertions of intellectual and moral superiority 
(Kendall  and  Michael  1997;  Latour  1993;  Michael  and  Kendall  1997)  and 
methodological  inactivity  masquerading  as  scepticism  (Kendall  and  Wickham 
1999)~ while the recent death of Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard has robbed postmodernism 
of its  most  coherent  spokesperson.  What we  want  to address  in  this  paper-
necessarily  schematically-is  what  comes  next.  Our  answer  is  a  nonmodern 
sociology that gives up hermeneutics in favour of  semiology or relational ism. 
Modernism begets 'Man' and hermeneutics 
Foucault  (1970)  analyses  the  central  place  given  to  the  figure  of 'Man'  by 
modernism.  Foucault describes how Man was born as simultaneously the principle 
and the subject of  history (Man, and only Man, can know history because Man, and 
only  Man,  makes  it).  In  Foucault's account,  the  premoderns (crudely speaking, 
those who live before the French and American revolutions) have no need of Man. 
In  the classical age, there was a congruence between theories of language, natural 
history,  and  wealth  and  value,  a  way of understanding the  world that precluded 
Man.  In  principle, it was possible to produce an  harmonious taxonomy out of the 
chaos and disorder of  the world.  In the classical episteme, knowledge is just about 
better ordering, precisely because the relationship between words and things is  one 
of transparency - there is,  as  yet,  no problem of interpretation.  It  is  only for the 
moderns that interpretation,  or hermeneutics, becomes necessary.  Of course, the 
moderns  did  not  invent  hermeneutics,  but they raised  it  up  until  it  became  the 
fundamental form of  inquiry of  the nascent human sciences. 
We  can  make  this  a  little  clearer  by discussing  one  of the  examples  from 
Foucault (1970).  Foucault makes a distinction between a JTemodern  knowledge, 
the analysis of wealth, and modernist economics.  For the premodern knowledge, 
simply describing the circulation of  wealth, which was represented by money, could 
solve the  problem  of the  analysis  of wealth.  In  typical  eighteenth-century texts 
dealing with wealth, for example, wealth springs fi'om  the land (either through the 
mining of precious metals or through the growth of  produce); the value of  things is 
linked  with  exchange;  money represents  wealth  and  is  used to  designate it as  it 
circulates~ and the circulation should be as  simple and complete as possible.  Man 
has no place in this schema; there merely exists a 'table' of  wealth to which Man is 
extraneous.  Note also that the analysis of  wealth requires noher111eneutic practice-
it merely requires description. 180  Social TheOlY 
So  what is  different  in  the  nineteenth  century?  Man has  been  invented  - Man 
speaks,  Man  lives,  Man's  labour  is  the  principle  of production.  These  three 
domains are understood as  having their own internal  laws  and rule systems.  and 
Man is  understood as  a  part of them  all.  In  the new economics,  and especially 
clearly in Adam Smith (177611961), Man enters the equation both as the dynamic 
force which makes wealth (through labour) and as the only one who can make sense 
of  the economy.  Smith's emphasis on the wealth-creating possibilities oflabour led 
him to dispute previous economic systems that stressed the place of  gold and silver 
(mercantilism, cameralism) or the land (physiocracy) as sources of wealth.  Labour 
is now the source of  a nation's wealth.  If  you have a healthy, productive and  large 
population, the gold and the silver will come in anyway.  Smith suggests that \ve  let 
the gold and silver take care of itself, al1d points to the cases of Spain and Portugal. 
who have a vhiual monopoly of newly-mined precious metals,  but cannot retain 
them because the labour power of  other nations drags them away. 
The new complexity that has suddenly invaded the analysis of wealth depends 
upon a double act - Man and hermeneutics.  Now in Foucault (1972) there seems to 
be  something of a  nostalgia for the premodern predilection for description  rather 
than  hermeneutics:  in  fact,  the  central  methodological  principles  focus  on  the 
development of an approach which is  nonanthropological (ie.  which eschews the 
myth of Man as the centre of the world) and noninterpretive (ie which doubts the 
value of  endless interpretation and suggests that careful description may be a better 
bet).  In short, Foucault deconstructs the two central planks of modernism, and calls 
for a new, nonmodern method.  Nearly thiIiy years later, so does Bruno Latour. 
Against postmodernism 
While  'Man'  has  disappeared  fi'om  the  postmodern  project,  hermeneutics  has 
become an obsession.  An endless round of critique based upon the compulsion to 
'unmask' provides Latour (1993) with a reason to attack postmodernism.  Latour's 
main task is to demonstrate the limits and confusions of modernism, but along the 
way postmodernism gets quite a hammering.  Postmodernism refuses the task of 
empirical description as 'scientistic' (modernist), yet it accepts the modernist idea of 
dividing time into successive revolutions,  leaving it  in  the  'ludicrous' position of 
coming after the moderns while arguing against the idea of  any 'after' (1993: 46-7). 
Postmodernists "really believe  ...  that scientists  are  extraterrestrials, that matter  is 
immaterial,  that  technology  is  ahuman,  that  politics  is  pure 
simulacrum  ... [Postmodernists are] simply stuck in the impasse of all  avant-gardes 
that have  no  more troops  behind  them" (1993:  62).  Later  in  his  book,  Latour 
emphasises the theme that: 
[P]ostmodernism is  a symptom, not a solution.  The postmoderns retain the modern 
fl'amework but disperse the elements that the modernisers grouped together in a well-
ordered cluster.  The postmoderns  ... are wrong to retain the framework and to keep on 
believing in the requirement of  continual novelty (1993: 74). 
Against modernist sociology 
Given  this  rejection  of postmodernism  as  an  alternative  to  modernism,  Latour 
makes several methodological points about modernist sociology.  In  his  quest  to 
overcome the effects of the moderns' division between nature and society,  Latour 
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sees  sociology  as  a hindrance  rather than  a help  - it  contributes  to  this  division 
through  its perpetuation of the  idea of a separate sphere of the  social.  For  Latour, 
sociology produces a dichotomy  between  objects and  society whereby society  is  a 
double  basis  for  denunciations  - alternately  being  so  strong  as  to  determine 
everything  about  objects  and  being  so  weak  as  to  be  completely  determined  by 
objects, depending on the requirements of the particular site of denunciation.  This is 
the  basis,  he  says,  for  all  society/other  dualisms  (like  society/individual  or 
society/community),  in  some  hard/soft  combination.  These  dualisms,  he  says, 
provide "99 per cent of  the social sciences' critical repelioire" (1993: 53-54). 
Latour  is  convinced  that  sociology  can  dispense  with  distinctions  between 
knowledge, belief and science (1993: 94) and can thereby dispense with the need to 
be critical.  He aims to escape fi'om  the  imperative to  unmask (that is,  always to be 
trying  to  reveal  something  supposedly  hidden)  and  proposes  a  "sociology  of 
criticism" in place of  "critical sociology"  (1993: 44). 
The  appeal  of these arguments  is  perhaps easier to  see when  consider some of 
Latour's  insights  about  anthropology.  It  seems  his  approach  is  more  akin  to 
anthropology, but only \vhen anthropology is  in the field, that is, when it is gathering 
information about other cultures.  He  says  anthropologists have no  problem seeing 
things  in  networks when they are  dealing with  'other' societies,  but cannot do  the 
same  to  their  'home',  western  societies.  They  cannot  because  the  boundaries 
between the  natural, the  social  and  the discursive seem  so  real  to them, trapped  as 
they are within modernism (1993: 7). 
Anthropology  'at home',  or  rather  'of home',  Latour  argues,  makes  a  false 
distinction  between  humans  and  nonhumans.  He  says  it  can  be  rescued  by being 
made 'symmetrical', made to give up the asymmetry of sociology of knowledge and 
epistemology  which  together  have  promoted  yet  another  false  division,  this  time 
between  true  and  false  science,  not  allowing  the  techn iques  for  examining  true 
knowledge to apply to  false  knowledge, forcing  us  to account for false  knowledge 
through such devices as  ideology (1993: 92).  Latour wants sociology to follow the 
lead of  a celiain type of  ethnology: 
every ethnologist  is capable of including \\ithin a single monograph the defInition of 
the  t()I'ces  in  play:  the  distribution  of pO\\ers  among  human  beings.  gods.  and 
nonhumans:  the  procedures  t(Jr  reaching  agreements:  the  connections  between 
religion  and  po\\er:  ancestors:  cosmology:  propeliy  rights:  plant  and  animal 
taxonomies.  The  ethnologist  \\ill  certainly  not  \\Tite  three  separate  books:  one 
dealing \\ith knowledge. another \\ith power. yet another with practices (1993:  14). 
By  Latour's  new  'nonmodernist'  method,  comparative  anthropology  "no  longer 
compares cultures, setting aside  its  own, through which some astonishing privilege 
possesses  a  unique  access  to  Nature.  It  compares  natures-cuitllres" (1993:  96, 
emphasis  in  original).  It  thereby  begins  to  treat  'home'  in  the  way  it  treats  the 
'tropics'.  The  proposed  'symmetrical  anthropology'  "uses  the  same  terms  to 
explain  truths  and  errors ...  it  studies  the  production  of humans  and  nonhumans 
simultaneously  ... finally  it refi'ains from  making any a priori declarations as to what 
might distinguish Westerners fi'om  Others"  (1993:  103). 
Nonmodernism  is  not about entering a new  era:  "we are  no  longer obliged to 
cling to the avant-garde of the avant-garde; we  no  longer seek to  be even cleverer, 
even  more  critical".  He  summarises:  "This  retrospective  attitude,  which  deploys 182  Social Theol)) 
instead of  unveiling, adds instead of  subtracting, fi'aternizes instead of denouncing  ... 
I characterize as nonmodern" (1993: 47).  He goes on to ask, how can we make the 
series of  shifts the nonmodern suggests? - from the world of  objects to that of quasi-
objects?  from  immanent/transcendent  society  to  collectives  of  humans  and 
nonhumans? how can we gain access to networks?  "We have to  trace the  modern 
dimension and the non modern dimension" (1993:  77),  we have to  real ise  that the 
nonmodern approach aims to restore the "mediating role to all agents" (1993: 78). 
Later  in  his  text  Latour  offers  more  discussion  on  the  direction  of these 
possibilities of  nonmodernism: 
by  traversing...  networks,  we  do  not  come  to  rest  in  anything  particularly 
homogeneous.  We  remain,  rather,  within  an  intra-physics...  we  do  not  tall  into 
immanence  alone,  since  networks  are  immersed  in  nothing.  We  do  not  need  a 
mysterious ether for them to  propagate themselves  ...  What sOli  of world  is  it  that 
obliges us to take into account, at the same time and in the same breath. the nature of 
things,  technologies,  sciences,  fictional  beings,  religions  large  and  small.  politics. 
jurisdictions,  economies and  unconsciousnesses?  Our own,  of course (1993:  128-
129). 
Latour asks a series of 'haven't you had enough?' questions about our attitude to the 
modern critical repertoires, including the following about sociology: "Are you not a 
little  tired  of those  sociologies  constructed  around  the  Social  only  ...  because 
sociologists  cannot cope either with the  content of objects  or with  the  world  of 
languages that nevertheless construct society?" (1993: 90). 
Nonmodernism and relativism 
In addressing the problem of  relativism, Latour discusses two variations: 
Absolute relativism presupposes cultures that are separate and incommensurable and 
cannot be ordered in any hierarchy  ... As for cultural relativism, which is more subtle. 
Nature comes into  play,  but in  order to  exist it  does  not presuppose any  scientitic 
work,  any  society,  any  construction,  any  mobilization,  any  network.  It  is  Nature 
revisited and corrected by epistemology ( 1993: 104). 
Latour criticises anthropology for traditionally allowing 'modest relativism' while at 
the  same time  allowing  "the  surreptitious  return  of arrogant  universalism  - we 
Westerners want to see ourselves as a special culture  ...  We Westerners cannot be one 
culture among others, since we also mobilize Nature", we think we actually control 
Nature through science.  "Thus at the heart of  the question of  relativism we find the 
question of science" (1993:  97).  He argues  that the "relativists have  never  been 
convincing on the equality of cultures, since they limit their consideration precisely 
to cultures".  The solution, according to Latour, "appears along with the dissolution 
of cultures.  All natures-cultures are  similar in  that they simultaneously construct 
humans,  divinities  and  nonhumans"  (1993:  1  06).  Differences  between  cultures 
might be sizeable, 
but they are only of size.  They are  important...  but they are not disproportionate ... 
The fact that one of  the collectives needs ancestors and tixed stars while ,motller one. 
more  eccentric,  needs  genes  and  quasars,  is  explained  by  the  dimensions  of the 
collective to  be held together.  A  much  larger number of objects  requires  a  much 
larger number of  subjects (1993: 108). 
Absolute  relativism,  Latour  goes  on,  has  "accepted  the  universalists'  viewpoint Social Theory  183 
while refusing to rally round it: ifno common, unique and transcendental measuring 
instrument  exists,  then  all  languages  are  untranslatable...  all  rites  equally 
respectable, all paradigms incommensurable" (1993: 112).  He argues that this is not 
taking  relativism  seriously-it  ignores  the  fact  that  the  process  of inventing 
measuring instruments is  also the process of seriously inventing commensurability. 
What is  needed, he says, is a relativist relativism (what he later calls 'relationalism' 
[1993:  114]): "The relativist relativists, more modest but more empirical, point out 
what  instruments  and  what chains  serve to  create  asymmetries  and  inequalities, 
hierarchies and differences  ... Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to 
anything else" (1993: 113). 
Nonmodernism and time 
Latour's nonmodern approach also provides a potential means of overcoming the 
confusions about temporality that he regards as  a defining feature of modernism. 
"Time is not a general framework but a provisional result of  the connection among 
entities" (I  993: 74).  As an example of  this point, Latour says he uses both a drill 
and a hammer, yet one is thirty-five years old, the other hundreds and thousands of 
years.  We all "mix up gestures from different times" (1993: 75).  "We have always 
actively  sOlied  out elements belonging to  different times  ... It is  the  sorting that 
makes  the  times,  not  the  times  that  make  the  sorting" (1993:  76,  emphasis  in 
original). 
Concluding remarks: uniting Foucault and Latour 
There is  much in  Latour that echoes Foucault: the attack on the critical approach, 
the  concern  about  simple  stories of causality,  and  the  acceptance of a  carefully 
worked form of relativism are all apparent.  Yet while Foucault's problematisation 
of modernism was the spur to much postmodern work, Latour presents us with the 
disturbing  possibility that postmodernism  is  no  position to cash out some of its 
theoretical  advances.  We  suggest that where  Foucault and  Latour can be  used 
together is in the formation of  a sociological approach that reserves judgement in its 
attempts to avoid being 'critical', that avoids being anthropological in that it forgets 
the modernist invention of  Man and the Constitution which cleaves the human fi'om 
the nonhuman, and that is  non  interpretive in that it deliberately avoids the endless 
rounds of  hermeneutics.  A recent book by Mitchell Dean (1994) ends up requesting 
a form of sociology which is not hermeneutic (which forgets to ask questions about 
what something 'really' is), but is  rather semiological (which concentrates instead 
011  describing relations between entities).  It seems to  us  that this  should be the 
direction for a  self-consciously nonmodern sociology.  And if we want to know 
what this type of  sociology might look like, there are plenty of  good examples in the 
recent socio logy of  science (eg Latour 1996). 
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Social change and narrative identity. 
Peter Keppel  Queensland University of  Technology 
Introduction 
The communitarian challenge \vhich emerged  in  response to John  Rawls' (191'2) A 
TheOl)' a/Justice has provided 25 years of  debate in which theories of  the individual 
have moved from  a politico-econom ic  base to  a socio-cultural one.  Rawls (1972) 
radical  revision  of liberalism  has  been  met with  an  equally  radical  critique.  Each 
thesis is paItly a response to changes in the structure of  society and pattly a result of 
internal  theoretical  debate,  and  each  has  attempted  to  provide  solutions  to  the 
problems that beset us  as  we  reach the end of both  modernity and  the  millennium. 
One recurring problem is  identity:  it has become an  issue again, a sure sign that it  is 
in crisis. 
The  liberal  and  communitarian  theses  begin  from  very  different  positions. 
Whereas  Rawls (1972) regards justice and  individual  rights  as  the  foundations  for 
an  individual pursuit of the good  life,  Maclntyre (1985) regards the virtues,  which 
he says can only be derived from  community, as the dispositions to cultivate for the 
pursuit of the good life.  These views define identity as  very different propositions 
for  each  thesis.  Rawls  (1972)  identity  is  an  abstract,  given  one,  whereas 
Macintyre's (1985)  is  deeply  embedded  in  community.  This  essay  will  examine 
Macintyre's (1985) proposition  in  light of changes occurring  in  the  contemporary 
landscape.  In doing so,  it will be shown that his concept of identity  is conceptually 
problematic and ultimately fails when contl'onted with these changes. 
The self and plural society 
For  Macintyre (1985), the  modern  liberal  self is  fragmented.  The  partitioning of 
human  action,  the  atomization  of practices  to  a  set  of basic  actions  and  the 
separation of individuals from  their roles  all  prevent a conception of the  individual 
as  a unity.  Thus the  liberal  individual cannot be  seen  as  a bearer of virtues, as  an 
individual separated from  his  or  her roles  loses the  arena of social  relationships  in 
which  the  vittues  function.  For  the  virtues  to  be  cultivated,  a  unity  of self is 
required and this can  only emerge  tl'om  a narrative  which  contains the  self as  the 